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Decision Making Under Conflicting Criteria In 
Pension Valuations: An Expected Utility Model 
Lisa Lipowski Posey* and Arnold F. Shapiro t 
Abstract 
Many of the criteria used by actuaries when selecting assumptions for pen-
sion plan valuations often conflict. As a result, actuaries must weigh the vari-
ous costs and benefits associated with a particular set of assumptions. We use 
expected utility theory to model the process of chOOSing actuarial assumptions 
when faced with potentially conflicting criteria. The three criteria considered 
are prudence, best estimate, and conservatism. 
The actual contribution chosen by the actuary is found to depend on the 
contribution level that triggers a red flag with respect to tax deductibility. If 
this level is relatively low, the actuary chooses a high contribution that gives 
weight to each criterion, incorporating the risk of a penalty by tax authorities. 
If the tax deductible trigger is of an intermediate level, the actuary chooses this 
level exactly and insulates the plan from tax scrutiny; if the level is high, the 
utility maximizing contribution is below that level. 
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estimate, conservatism 
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1 Introduction 
In the United States defined benefit pension plan valuations must be 
performed periodically by the plan actuary. As noted by Shapiro (1990), 
however, many of the criteria underlying the choice of assumptions for 
these valuations often conflict. This observation is not surprising-
while the ultimate choice of actuarial assumptions rests with the ac-
tuary, the actuary must balance his or her preferences and judgments 
against those of a number of self-interest groups, including employees, 
the employer, and tax and labor authorities. 
The main purpose of this paper is to describe a methodology that 
can be used by actuaries to resolve problems associated with conflicting 
assumptions. The methodology uses expected utility theoryl to model 
the process of choosing actuarial assumptions when faced with poten-
tially conflicting criteria. To keep the model simple, only three criteria 
are considered: prudence, best estimate, and conservatism. This is a 
first attempt at modeling actuarial decision making. 
2 The Criteria 
The first criterion, prudence, is satisfied if the contribution that re-
sults is in the range of prudent contributions (that is, contributions that 
would be developed by prudent actuaries in similar circumstances). The 
context considered is the one where tax authorities are concerned with 
the possibility of overfunding to escape current taxation and conse-
quently define a deductible contribution as one that is below a certain 
upper limit.2 Because excise taxes and other penalties may result if 
deductions are taken for nondeductible contributions, one limit on the 
range of prudent assumptions is that such assumptions produce a safe 
IThis is the expected utility theory developed by von Neumann and Morgenstern 
(1947). See Schoemaker (1982) for a discussion of the pros and cons of expected utility 
theory. 
2In the case where, for example, the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC) is 
concerned with the adequacy of plan funding, the range defined by a lower limit on the 
contribution may be equally important. In this model concerns about plan solvency 
are captured by the conservatism criterion. It is assumed that plan solvency is in the 
interest of the actuary and the plan sponsor and is imbedded in the utility function. 
Further pressure by the PBGC is not considered at this stage. 
Editor's note: The PBGC is a self-financed public corporation that administered the 
pension benefits insurance program for qualified plans in the United States. See, for 
example, McGill (1984, Chapter 24) for more on the PBGC. 
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harbor contribution.3 It is assumed that whether the plan contribution 
satisfies a safe harbor is not of concern, however, if the plan can meet 
a facts and circumstance test. 4 Moreover, this test is characterized in 
terms of the relationship between the actual contribution and the con-
tribution that would have funded the plan accurately. 
The actual contribution to the plan is denoted as C; the contribution 
that would have funded the plan accurately is denoted C;5 and the con-
tribution that triggers a red flag with respect to deductibility is denoted 
C*. It is assumed the authorities do not investigate the assumptions 
to determine if they are appropriate unless C > C*. If C > C*, then 
authorities determine whether C - C > D, where D is an acceptable 
deviation. 
If C > C* and C - C > D, the actuary is penalized.6 The penalty 
is modeled here as a monetary penalty of P dollars. This can repre-
sent anything ranging from a fine to damage to one's reputation that 
would reduce earning power. An excise tax may be levied upon the plan 
sponsor that may have repercussions for the actuary in terms of com-
pensation, job security, or future job prospects. The actuary may face a 
lawsuit and possible loss of accreditation. 7 Furthermore, it is assumed 
that the damage to the actuary's reputation also leaves the actuary with 
a lower level of utility for any given wealth level in the event that the 
actuary is penalized. The prudent actuary's rule is characterized by a 
variable, p (the penalty), which takes the following values: 
= S 0 if ~ ::0; ~* or if ~ > C* and C - C ::0; D; 
P l P if C > C* and C - C > D. 
Deductibility raises a perplexing problem. Solvency is one of the 
primary considerations underlying the funding of a pension plan, but 
the taxing authority may not explicitly allow a contingency reserve to 
protect this solvency. Additionally, as modeled above, there may be 
an arbitrary limit to the maximum deductible contribution to a plan. 
3This would be the case, for example, if the contribution were no larger than if all 
the assumptions used were the most generous allowed under IRS standards. 
4This test is satisfied if the facts and circumstances surrounding the plan justify the 
assumptions. 
5The quantity C is known after the actual plan experience has unfolded. 
6In this modeJ, we assume that the authorities always will discover the fact that 
C > C* and C - C > D. The authors currently are investigating a model where the 
occurrence of this event is a random variable. 
7The simplifying assumption is made that the size of the monetary penalty is not 
a function of the size of the contribution or the experience of the plan. It is possible 
that these and other factors may have an impact on the size of the penalty, in which 
case the penalty would not be a constant. 
120 Journal of Actuarial Practice, Vol. 3, No.1, 1995 
Because of adverse experience, however, the deductible contribution 
may not be sufficient to keep the plan solvent. 
The second criterion, conservatism, follows from the concern about 
plan solvency. The actuary (as well as the plan sponsor) prefers to keep 
the probability that the plan has actuarial losses to a minimum. There-
fore, the contribution is conservative if Pr[e < C] < E or, equivalently, 
Pr[C> e 1 < E, where E is the tolerance level for conservatism (that is, 
if the probability of actuarial losses is below E). The actuary uses only 
his or her beliefs about the distribution of C to determine Pr[ C > e]. 
It is assumed that the actuary believes that C has a cumulative distri-
bution function F(C). This is the actuary's subjective belief about the 
distribution of C and is necessary if expected utility theory is to be 
used. Therefore, the actuary concerned about conservatism prefers a 
contribution, e, for which 1 - F(e) < E. 
The final criterion incorporated in the model is the best estimate. 
For this analysis, best estimate is interpreted to mean the estimate for 
which the expected value of the absolute deviation of the actual value 
from the estimate is minimized, as suggested by Anderson (1985, p. 
110). Again, the plan experience is characterized in terms of C, the 
contribution that would have funded the plan accurately. The actuary's 
best estimate of C is p, i.e., the actuary believes that if CE is defined 
as any estimate of C, then E[ICE - CI] is minimized when the estimate 
CE = p. 
3 The Expected Utility Model 
At this point the actuary's decision process is modeled explicitly us-
ing the theory of expected utility. We assume that the actuary obtains 
utility from three sources: (i) wealth, (ii) the appropriateness of his or 
her assumptions, and (iii) plan solvency. The appropriateness of the as-
sumptions may affect wealth through a potential penalty. Apart from 
that, the actuary simply feels good about making an appropriate esti-
mate and enjoys positive recognition from his or her employer.s The 
two aspects of the appropriateness of the assumptions that are mod-
eled here are accuracy and conservatism. The accuracy (or inaccuracy) 
of the assumptions is measured by Ie - CI, with smaller values rep-
resenting greater accuracy. The larger the value of Ie - CI, the lower 
the actuary's utility, and this inaccuracy is weighted by a constant .\ in 
8We assume that neither the actuary nor the employer is motivated to overfund the 
plan for the specific purpose of deferring taxation. 
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the utility function. But due to concerns about solvency and conser-
vatism, the actuary's utility is reduced further when there are actuarial 
losses. Therefore, whenever C < C, the actuary has additional disutility 
equal to a constant y. The actuary's disutility due to actuarial losses is 
characterized by a variable r that takes the following values: 
r = A { 
0 if C ~ C; 
Y ifC<C. 
The actuary's utility function U is given by U(W -p, IC -CI, n, where 
W represents his or her wealth before the penalty is determined.9 As-
suming additivity,10 this utility function can be written more explicitly 
as: 
U(W - p, IC - cl,n = us(W - p) - AIC - CI- r (1) 
where us(W - p) is the utility of wealth in state of nature 5. We assume 
there are two states of nature: 5 = 0 represent the state where the 
actuary is not penalized, and 5 = 1 represent the state where the actuary 
is penalized. For each state 5, utility increases with wealth (so u~ > 0), 
and risk aversion with respect to wealth implies that u; < O. We assume 
that uo(w) > U1 (w) for any given wealth level w. This implies that the 
actuary suffers more than just a monetary fine when penalized by the 
authorities. Once sanctioned by the authorities, the actuary is worse 
off, in utility terms, at any given wealth level. 
In choosing the contribution, C, the actuary maximizes his or her 
expected utility where the expectation is taken over the distribution 
F (C). So, the actuary solves for the C that maximizes the right hand 
side of the equation: 
maxE[us(W - p) - A(IC - CI) - r] 
t 
maxE[us(W - p)] - AE[IC - CI] - y(1 - F(C)) (2) 
t 
where 0 ~ p ~ P. 
Each of the three terms on the right hand side of equation (2) rep-
resents one of the criteria that the actuary uses in making the funding 
decision. The second term represents the best estimate criterion. The 
9 A more general representation of the actuary's utilit)' function is U(Y(W. p).IC -
el, n. where Y and W represent wealth after and before the penalty, respectively, and 
p represents an arbitrary penalty function. 
laThe authors are currently investigating a more general formulation of this utility 
function. The Simplified version in the text, however, is sufficient to convey the essence 
of the model. 
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contribution that minimizes this term (and hence maximizes its contri-
bution to expected utility) is the best estimate, /-'. But the best estimate 
may not be the optimal contribution for the plan due to the offsetting 
effects of the two other criteria. The third term, representing conser-
vatism, is the probability of an actuarial loss weighted by the disutility 
such a loss brings. This term is subtracted from expected utility. To 
maximize this term's contribution to expected utility, the probability 
of an actuarial loss 1 - F(C) must be minimized. This provides an in-
centive for the actuary to choose a contribution that is above the best 
estimate, i.e., to play it safe. On the other hand, the first term is the 
expected utility of wealth which is dependent upon whether a penalty 
is received from the authorities for choosing a contribution that may 
not be deductible. 
The actuary has an incentive to choose a contribution that is higher 
than the best estimate because of concerns about solvency. But govern-
ment officials may choose to interpret this behavior as an attempt to 
avoid current taxation. This exerts pressure on the actuary to choose 
a lower contribution. This first term is maximized when the chance of 
receiving a penalty and the subsequent damage to the actuary's repu-
tation is eliminated (that is, when the contribution is below the author-
ities' upper bound). The relative weight with which each of the three 
criteria enters expected utility determines the trade-off that must be 
made. Other factors that determine this trade-off are initial wealth, W, 
the size of the acceptable deviation, D, and the size of the penalty, P. A 
final factor is the actuary's perception of the distribution of C, in par-
ticular, how probable it is that the deviation will be greater than zero 
and/or greater than D. We now analyze this more formally. 
Let us assume F is such that Pr[CL s C s Cu) = 1. There are 
two possible ranges within which the chosen contribution, C, can fall, 
the prudent range where C E [CL, C*] or the other range where C E 
[C*, cu].11 A penalty is imposed when C E (C*, Cu] and C - C > 
D. On the other hand, when C E [CL, C*] there is no possibility of 
receiving a penalty. Therefore, analysis of the decision requires that 
the maximization problem given by equation (2) be separated into two 
steps because the expected utility function is discontinuous at the point 
C = C*. 
There are two expected utility functions that must be considered, 
one that applies for values of C s C* and one that applies for values 
of C > C*. We will graph both of these expected utility functions over 
the entire range of potential contributions, C, and illustrate how the 
llWe assume that [eL, C*] is not empty. 
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actuary's choice is affected by the tax authorities' choice of an upper 
limit on the prudent range, C*. 
The expected utility function that pertains to the range of contribu-
tions C ::::; C* is: 
Uo(W) - AE[IC - CI] - y(1- F(C)) 
uo(W) - A [J~ (C - C)dF(C) + J:u (C - C)dF(C) ] 
- y(I - F(C)), (3) 
while for the range of contributions C > C*: 
Ul (W - P)F(C - D) + uo(W) (1 - F(C - D)) 
- AE[IC - CI] - y(1 - F(C)) 
udW - P)F(C - D) + uo(W)(I - F(C - D)) 
- A [J~ (C - C)dF(C) + J:u (C - C)dF(C) ] 
- y(I - F(C)). (4) 
Comparison of equations (3) and (4) indicates that for any given 
value of C greater than CL + D, the expression on the left hand side 
of equation (3) is greater than that of equation (4) because uo(W) > 
Ul (W - p).12 Furthermore, the gap between these two functions in-
creases as C increases because more weight is given to Ul (W - P) as 
F (C - D) increases. 
Next, the contribution that provides the maximum level of expected 
utility must be determined. Differentiating13 equations (3) and (4) with 
respect to C yields equations (5) and (6), respectively. Setting equations 
(5) and (6) each equal to zero gives the conditions for the maximum 
values of E[ Uc,;c*] and E[ Ubc*], respectively: 
~ d ~ 
-A(2F(C) - 1) + y-~ F(C) 
dC 
o 
(5) 
120nly contributions that are greater than CL + D are potential choices as the maxi-
mization problem is established. Intuitively, as long as the best estimate, /1, is greater 
than CL + D (as will be assumed), contributions that are less than CL + D will not be 
chosen because C - C cannot be greater than D, implying that there are no potential 
penalties in this range and, therefore, no benefits to be gained from reducing the con-
tribution below CL + D. This further implies that C - D > CL for any possible sollltion, 
soF(C-D»O. 
13We now assume that F(C) is differentiable in the relevant regions. 
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d ~ (udW - P) - uo(W)) dCF(C - D) 
A d ~ 
- A(2F(C) - 1) + y-~F(C) 
dC 
O. 
(6) 
A useful point of comparison is the best estimate j.1, which is ob-
tained by minimizing E[ I C - C I]; that is, by solving: 
M2 = mdn [J~ (C - C)dF(C) + f:u (C - C)dF(C)] . (7) 
The first order condition for the problem of equation (7) is: 
2F(C) - 1 = O. (8) 
The value of C that solves equation (8) is the best estimate and is de-
noted j.1, where j.1 is the median because F(j.1) = 1/2. 
4 An Example 
For the purpose of example, assume that C is uniformly distributed 
on the interval [CL, Cu].14 The best estimate is: 
CL + Cu j.1= 2 (9) 
Furthermore, the contributions that maximize E[UC:5C*] and E[U6c*], 
respectively, and the shapes of these expected utility functions can be 
obtained by substituting for F(C) into equations (5) and (6).1 5 Using 
equation (9), we have: 
d -~ E[UCA'<CA*] dC -
y-2-A(C-j.1) 
(Cu - Cd 
o 
o. 
(10) 
14This assumption is not meant to imply that this is the appropriate distribution for 
C, but is used to allow a clear characterization of the solution that may be obtained 
using this model. 
15We assume that the contribution that maximizes E[Uc"c* J and the contribution 
that maximizes E[Ut>c* J are elements of the interval [CL, Cu J. 
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Both E[Uc:sc*] and E[Uc>c*] are strictly concave, as the second deriva-
tive with respect to C of each is negative. 
Next, let the solution to (10) be denoted C3 and the solution to (11) 
be denoted C4. 16 Then E[Uc:sc*] is maximized at: 
~ Y C3 = J.l +-2i\ 
and E[Uc>c*] is maximized at: 
C~ - L _ uo(W) - udW - P) 4 - J.l + 2i\ 2i\ . 
(12) 
(13) 
When there is no concern about a penalty by the authorities, as is the 
case when C :::; C*, the optimal contribution, C3, is the best estimate, J.l, 
plus a contingency reserve equal to one half of the relative disutility of 
insolvency (that is, disutility, y, relative to the weight given to accuracy, 
i\). When there is the possibility of a penalty (because the contribution 
is not in the prudent range), then the optimal contribution, C4, is C3 
reduced by one half of the relative disutility of being penalized (that is, 
the change in utility caused by a penalty, uo(W) - Ul (W - P), relative 
to the weight given to accuracy, i\). 
The two expected utility functions, E[Uc:sc*] and E[Ut>c*] now can 
be graphed over the range of potential contributions to illustrate how 
the value of C* impacts the actuary's funding choice. The following 
characteristics of the expected utility functions have been determined 
from the above analysis. E[Ucd*] is greater than E[Ut>c*] for any 
given value of C, and the difference between these two functions in-
creases as C increases. Both E[ U c:sc*] and E[ U t>c*] are strictly con-
cave, and E[Uc:sc*] reaches its maximum value at a higher contribution 
level than E[Ut>c*] does (because C3 > (4). 
Figure 1 is based on the foregoing observations. An important point 
on this graph is the lowest contribution level at which E[Uc:sc*] is ex-
actly equal to the maximum value of E[Ut>(':'*]' This contribution level 
is denoted Cs (thatis, E[Uc:sc* (Cs)] = E[Ut>c* (C4) ]),17 It is necessary 
16Both of these points exist and are unique because the functions that are being 
maximized have been shown to be concave. 
17Solving for C5 explicitly gives: 
C - C uo(W) -Ul(W -P) (C DC) 
5 - 4 - 2Ap + Y 4 - - L· 
It is possible that the value C5 is less than CL, in which case it does not appear on 
the graph. The following analysis will make clear that if this is the case, the optimal 
contribution must be in the prudent range. 
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to know the value of C* to determine which expected utility function is 
relevant over which range of contributions. E[ U c"c*] is the applicable 
expected utility function for all contributions below C*, and E[Ut>c*] 
is applicable for contributions above C*. If C* is greater than C3, then 
C3 is the contribution that is chosen by the actuary because expected 
utility is maximized at that point. If C5 < C* :s; C3, then the optimal 
contribution is C*. If C* = C5, then the actuary is indifferent between 
C* and C4. Finally, if C* < C5, then the optimal contribution is C4. 
EU 
A C4 
Figure 1 
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Further, Figure 1 indicates that when the upper bound on the pru-
dent range is relatively high (that is, higher than the contribution that 
maximizes the expected utility in the absence of a penalty), then the 
constraint provided by the authorities is not binding and the actuary's 
choice (C3) is a trade-off between the criteria of best estimate and con-
servatism. When the upper bound on the prudent range is in some 
middle range (that is, C5 < C* :s; (3), then the actuary chooses the up-
per bound as the optimal contribution because it is preferable to avoid 
the possibility of a penalty. When the upper bound on the prudent 
range is relatively low (that is, below (5), then it is in the actuary's best 
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interest to choose a contribution above the prudent range that makes a 
trade-off between the criteria of conservatism, prudence, and best es-
timate. In this case, the chosen contribution is C4. If C5 is less than CL, 
then it is necessarily less than C*, implying that for any C* E [CL, Cu] 
the optimal contribution, C, is in the prudent range. 
5 Summary 
The purpose of this paper has been to explore the use of expected 
utility theory to model the process by which an actuary chooses the 
appropriate contribution for a pension plan. Because this is just a first 
attempt, however, only a simple expected utility model is used and 
only three criteria are considered: prudence, best estimate, and con-
servatism. Nonetheless, we are able to conceptualize the essence of 
some of the relationships. 
Based on our model, the actual contribution chosen by the actuary 
depends on the contribution level that triggers a red flag with respect 
to tax deductibility. If this level is relatively low, the actuary chooses a 
high contribution that gives weight to each criterion, incorporating the 
risk of a penalty by tax authorities. If the tax deductible trigger is of an 
intermediate level, the actuary chooses this level exactly and insulates 
the plan from tax scrutiny; if the level is high, the utility maximizing 
contribution is below that level. 
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